Much of the scholarly debate over Islam and democracy has centered on what has been referred to as the "inclusion-moderation hypothesis" (Schwedler 2006) and whether democratic institutions are capable of incorporating hostile religious actors. This paper proposes to build on this debate by broadening both our concept of inclusion and our expectations about its political effects. The paper presents a theoretical model for understanding the interaction between religion-state relationships and democratization processes in predominantly Muslim societies and argues that inviting ambivalently democratic religious actors into the public democratic space produces dynamics of both political moderation and religious change. The second half of this paper evaluates the mechanisms of the theory by tracing the evolution of two Islamist political parties in Algeria, the MSP-Hamas and Ennahda-Islah.
It is difficult to deal fully with these complexities which arise from a region whose regimes have been characterized as various types of "liberalized autocracies." 3 In this paper I recognize the limitations to drawing hard theoretical conclusions about the future democratic behavior of Islamists using evidence from their participation in less-than-democratic regimes.
Nevertheless, I argue that as long as measures of state liberalization entail a substantive change in the direction of open competition, and as long as candidates and parties have the chance to win power which allows them to influence policy, then we can still begin to explore whether important theoretical mechanisms function when Islamists participate in democratic politics.
Moving beyond a simple inclusion-moderation schema, I argue that Islamist participation in some form of electoral politics ought to give 1) some indication about the "moderating" effects of democratic participation on Islamist behavior and discourse but also 2) reveal something about what kind of democratic society Islamist participation would likely help to form.
In what follows I present a modified version of the moderation-inclusion hypothesis which defines inclusion more broadly than is often understood and which contextualizes inclusion strategies by parallel changes in the institutional relationship between religion and 
Radical, Moderate, Democratic?
In order to demonstrate that Islamist parties have moderated in response to a strategy of inclusion, we first have to demonstrate that they were radical or more radical before they were offered inclusion. In the literature, "radical" is employed to describe Islamist parties' explicit or implicit hostility to democratic institutions and ideas. While this hostility is sometimes equated with certain Islamist politicians' denial of democracy and their advocacy of violence, it is often more associated with the "type" of democracy that Islamist politicians propose. 6 In its most robust versions 7 this argument focuses on the theological incompatibilities between the Islam that Islamists propose and democratic precepts. That version of Islam utilizes doctrine which claims there is no sovereignty outside of the sovereignty of God in order to irrevocably fuse religion and the state and endow unelected religious officials with ultimate political authority. In its ideal, an Islamic state, furthermore, would call for the full application of Shari'a law, which would grant wide powers to non-elected religious authorities to marginalize the individual rights of secular and other (and less) religious citizens by criminalizing their non-Islamic conduct and reducing their rights to express and organize freely, fundamental rights needed to guarantee free and competitive elections in the first place. Rather than playing the part of a loyal opposition to elected, non-religious governments, Islamist parties would attempt to instrumentalize democratic institutions for non-democratic ends by mobilizing their religious faithful to vote in a confessional-authoritarian Islamic state, the one-man, one-vote, one-time hypothesis.
The radicalness of Islamist parties, thus, has to do with Islamism as a political ideology and the hostility of that ideology to democracy. This hostility can be described as a function of the religious exclusivity proposed at the heart of Islamism, which a) refuses the legitimacy of non-religious political parties and candidates and b) violates fundamental democratic rights which guarantee freedom for plural religious belief, expression and association. If we accept this definition of radical, we can then define moderation as the reduction of religious exclusivity. In their classic work on democratic transitions, Linz and Stepan 8 argue that successful transitions to democracy occur when the majority of political actors and citizens agree to play by the democratic rules of the game. If the exclusive nature of Islamist parties' words and deeds put in doubt their willingness to play by the democratic rules of the game, then our measure of moderation ought to be whether those same parties began saying and doing things which make clear that they will sustain those rules.
It is important to note here that Linz and Stepan's definition of transition evokes the "minimal" or "procedural" definition of democracy 9 which prizes the pragmatic nature of democracy as a legitimate political arena within which to solve conflicts. For these definitions, religious-based politics pose no problem as long as the proponents of those politics are willing to respect other democratic political parties and the basic rights of non-religious citizens. 10 This is national regulation of moral values. This paper's definition of moderation is less trained on measuring how liberal, secular and western Islamists might become, than on whether or not they grow more committed to playing by the basic rules of the game.
To measure whether or not the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is valid our task is to show change: that Islamist parties had previously said and did things which put in doubt their willingness to play by the democratic rules of the game and that, on account of inclusionary measures by the regime, these same parties put to rest those doubts. This will involve some measure of their behavior (whether or not they participate in elections and adhere to some minimum requirements of rights) as well as some measure of their ideological discourse (whether or not they acknowledge the legitimacy of opposition politics and democratically elected officials).
It should be noted here that the decision of Islamists to participate in elections and moderate their political goals could be understood as the result of efforts by the government to manipulate or co-opt them. 12 For the inclusion-moderation hypothesis to be valid, therefore, offers of inclusion must create some "arenas of democracy" 13 within the regime, where Islamists can stake out their own policy positions relatively independent of government pressures. The patterns of action and discourse that Islamists establish within these arenas give us some indication of any substantive evolution of their policy and goals with respect to democracy.
Whether they use their limited levers to strengthen democratic institutions, build deeper alliances with non-religious parties and create more internal party democracy can all be understood as evidence that Islamists have begun assuming habits of democracy that will probably not be so quickly shed if fully free and fair elections were to be had and won by them.
14

Inclusion to Moderation?
In her excellent review and critique of the various versions of the moderation-inclusion hypothesis, Schwedler 15 argues that most scholars focus on the effects that 1) new institutional constraints and 2) the exposure to alternative views have on the strategic behavior and discourse of radical parties and candidates when they participate in elections and win political power.
While incorporating some of these mechanisms of change into my model, I want to focus here on the effects that the participation of Islamists in elections has for the political saliency of religious identity, specifically, the religious exclusivity of their political goals. encourage a wider acceptance of the (democratic) rules of the game as the combined and reinforcing effects of 1) the dynamics set into motion by the electoral process and 2) the changed conditions of the religion-state framework.
Once they have been persuaded to nominally sanction the electoral process, at an elite level, elections create pressures to mobilize outside of an exclusively religious base in order to gain political power. 17 At the same time, once some power has been won, the electoral process requires that it be exercised with enough efficiency in order to maintain that power and win elections in the future. This is the classic manner by which many theorists have understood mechanisms of moderation. New institutional constraints change the costs of behavior for radical political parties, in certain cases making it less costly to participate than to engage in violent action by promising the achievement of similar results. 18 The need to convince the average voter of their continued electoral worth and the need to produce material-political results in order to do so also means that pragmatic and technical politicians gain importance over radicals and ideologues 19 and can stimulate an evolution in a party's platform and ideas.
At the same time, radical religious leaders may respond to the pressures of electoral politics and the ascendance of pragmatists within the party by becoming more moderate themselves. Classic arguments of exposure argue that a strategic response to a change in the cost/benefit ratio of participation can also work hand-in-hand with mechanisms of learning to produce a substantive evolution of political goals. Putting radical politicians in charge of mundane political tasks, like fixing pot-holes, 21 forces them to expend their energies on issues affecting the common good, and, as a result, to re-evaluate their relationship with the whole of the electorate. 22 The presence of a free and critical press intensifies this exposure and forces
Islamists to defend and reform their message before a skeptical audience. 23 As Fuller notes, 24 the need for practical results combined with a demanding press makes it much more difficult for
Islamists to defend a simplistic "Islam is the Solution" platform, creating incentives, instead, to consider adopting other, less religiously-exclusive but politically successful, policy positions.
What is more, if a strategy of inclusion guarantees a non-manipulated public voice for
Islam in the political life of the nation, religious elites can no longer play the "survival" or "protest" card to make successful political appeals. Religiously friendly government policies dampen the effect of Islamist electoral tactics based simply on an appeal towards protecting Islamic values, forcing Islamists, once again, to expand their mobilizing strategies to distinguish themselves and build support. Inclusion in this broader sense, therefore, reinforces the dynamics of electoral competition to prize those religious leaders who can re-frame their religious goals to include less-religious voters. These dynamics combined make it difficult for the voices of the most anti-democratic aspects of religious platforms to be projected electorally, namely, those which claim that one religion holds the rights to political and moral authority and refuse the legitimacy of plural political contestation.
Although it is often presented as a theory about elites, we would expect similar dynamics to operate at an individual level of analysis. If religious individuals are convinced by state actions of government favoritism of religion and are encouraged by their religious authorities to mobilize for elections, they will be more likely to understand the democratic arena as a legitimate place to solve their political problems. With the existential threat to their religious identity removed, it is also likely that their own religious identity will take on less salience in their political desires, and, exposed to appeals by other (non-Islamist but religiously-friendly)
political parties, that they will consider giving them their political vote.
Further Reflections on Inclusion
So far we have hypothesized that a strategy of inclusion may generate moderation in the behavior and discourse of Islamist parties with respect to democracy if those offers of inclusion entail both a) being given the chance to exercise political power within some arenas of democracy and b) creating a more favorable relationship between religion and state. We have argued that this moderation occurs as a function of the political secularization of Islamist parties who set aside the most exclusively religious aspects of their religious-political platforms to win elections and exercise power. Before moving on to examine this theory in the case of Algeria, I
would like to make two additional observations about this hypothesis.
First, the hypothesis does not predict that religious actors and ideas go away. One way of interpreting the key mechanism of the moderation-inclusion hypothesis is that through the promotion of the relationship of Islam and nation, state leaders rob Islamism of its political salience, and depoliticize the most anti-regime aspects of a rival political ideology. 
Origins and Hostilities
This section explores the origins and platforms of these two parties and their founding figures to measure the extent to which and in which ways they were radical. As the amalgam of names above indicates, these two sets of parties, which are the main Algerian Islamist parties which have survived in the Bouteflika-era, have also frequently changed names and composition.
This is due to both the 1997 change in legal requirements for acceptable political party platforms and, in the case of Ennahda, internal crises. The founding fathers, however, and principal Nahnah was even considered to be the second-in-command of the organization, after Sahnoun. Afghanistan to help fight the Soviets. 31 Although Nahnah openly renounced violence as a political option in Algeria in the early 1990s, he and his parties' objectives must be put into this proper context. Nahnah espoused a more moderate form of political Islamism which became even more moderate over time, but it was not clear how much Nahnah's dedication to the creation of an Islamic state would allow him to support democratic precepts of pluralism and contestation, and whether his willingness to violently contest a profane government in Afghanistan would lead him to do the same in Algeria.
In earlier interviews, Nahnah's attachment to more exclusive Islamic goals is clear in discourse and context. In the 1990s, for example, Nahnah coined the phrase "shuracracy" to describe the type of democracy his party stood for, one that was participatory, but according to Islamic traditions of consultation, or shura, which would limit the effective powers of popular suffrage through Islamic legislation and moral guarantees. 32 In such terms, Nahnah would describe himself and his party as "people who believe in Shari'a law, but not one imposed by swings of an axe." 33 While in the same line renouncing violence as a legitimate political recourse, Nahnah also raised doubts about his attachment to an electoral system that would allow non-religious parties to propose secular or immoral legislation which was opposed to his own Islamic vision of democracy.
Djaballah, on the other hand, was even clearer than Nahnah about his dedication to the construction of an Islamic state, as well as the tensions that such a dedication posed for a democratic regime. Throughout the 1990s, Djaballah was hard pressed when questioned to be openly pro-democratic, and the support he lent to elections were always hid between lines of attack against the democratic west and "laico-communists." Unlike Nahnah, Djaballah never Not only was it difficult for him even to evoke democracy in the 1990s, but Djaballah's platform was overwhelmingly, exclusively religious, with little politico-economic content. 36 His religious goals of the time were not tempered by the possibility of a space to work with nonreligious parties, nor did he signal some possibility for cooperation with them. As he said in institutions remained tilted in the power of the executive, 39 political parties of all stripes were able to compete for power; an animated, critical press was left relatively free to skewer its politicians, including the president; and associations and unions were allowed to challenge policies.
Nahnah was able to capitalize on the re-opening of the political space in Algeria and won twenty-five percent of the national vote in 1995. Adding Djaballah's share to Nahnah's, the two
Islamists recuperated more than three-fourths of the aggregate Islamist vote which had presumably gone to the FIS in1991. The renunciation of violence, to a greater and lesser degree, by the MSP and Ennadha, coupled with the traumatic experience of Algerian society with a decade of terror, meant that it was unlikely that either party would turn to violent politics in the short run. Yet, the failures of the Algerian state throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s 40 had also kept the promise of political Islam to reform Algerian politics alive, and both Nahnah and Djaballah entered the political process in 1995 with an ideological vision which was essentially unchanged since their parties' formations.
Nahnah's support for the regime during its period of closure, his decision to participate in 1995, and his strong showing in those elections were rewarded with several middling ministerial portfolios, two for the period 1996-97, and seven in 1997-99. 41 Then, in 1999 Nahnah accepted an invitation to ally with the new presidential candidate, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. With Bouteflika's election, Nahnah's party was rewarded with more important ministries, such as "Industry and Thus, in the early 2000s, the MSP continued to capitalize on religious issues, declaring itself in favor of increased Arabic education, but against any changes to the pro-Shari'a family code. 43 Yet, even in these religious-cultural battles, the MSP proved it was ready to put aside its Islamic ideology for political gains. In 2004, for example, the MSP voiced opposition to the government's proposed education reform that would suppress the offer of a degree in Islamic sciences in high schools, but then backtracked once it became clear that the President was not going to budge on the issue. The MSP reframed its opposition to the proposal by noting that the Algerian state had already, courageously, declared its commitment to a national Muslim identity and, that, as such, "the elements which make-up the national identity are not so much subjects to be taught, as a national task which is to be accomplished by the Algerian state." 44 Similarly, together with Djaballah, the MSP also originally rejected any revision to the family code proposed by the government, whom they accused of forcing through laws which would encourage the secularization of society. Although both parties openly declared that there was no room for compromise on the issue, the MSP then publically stated it was ready to accept the full reform of the code if Bouteflika would only lift the state of emergency he had declared vis-à-vis terrorism. 45 In doing so, the MSP showed it was willing to put aside its ideology in order to win more political freedom for itself and the whole of the Algerian system by working to put an end to a policy which the state had used to curtail political liberties. When Bouteflika refused such a deal, the MSP affirmed that their attachment to their alliance with Bouteflika was more important than their goals with respect to the family code, but continued to press Bouteflika on those goals nevertheless. 46 In were afraid of an Islamic party and so our first gain as a party was to make an Islamic movement acceptable ... The MSP is a party in evolution. We are not a religious party, not even in our way of "Islamic" thinking -we are a civic party and do not try to make religion a totalizing aspect of our politics like the FIS did." to say that all must be of the same political color." 54 Then, to contest the re-election of President Bouteflika, Djaballah entered into an electoral alliance with the only Algerian political party to continue to openly militate for a fully secular democracy, namely, Said Saadi's Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie (RCD), whose legal status as an explicitly secular party Djaballah had challenged ten years earlier. 55 This temporary alliance set a new institutional strategy for Djaballah, bent on establishing, above all, a democratic alteration of power and continuing to form alliances in order to do so. As with the electoral law, Djaballah and his party understood that such an alteration represented a desirable check on the limits of government power, even if it equally strengthened the possibility for all opposition parties to assume power.
Therefore, explains an Islah MP in Algiers, in this context, "The essential goal is to continue to work, again and again, within the legal framework, within the legislature, through peaceful change and even through alliances … to create a change in this current political power." In doing so, however, the state sanctioned and subsidized the trend towards religious Thus, as the CIDDEF (2009) surveys also note, even as a majority of Algerian women wear a veil, they do so in varying fashions, from the most designer to the most modest and accompany it with a wide array of jeans, dresses, pants, lipstick and eyeliner. And even as more men and women are reluctant to say that polygamy is religiously wrong and divorce morally permissible, the numbers of the former continue to fall and the latter to rise. 68 Likewise, despite rising religious reticence about women in the workplace and the moral hazards of modern life, more women feel comfortable about going out in public "into the streets," the rate of women going to work continues to grow (albeit modestly), and fewer parents admonish their children to not drink beer. loyal to the MSP and other student groups which has resulted in at least one student death so far. discounted. Yet, it is becoming more difficult to argue that these Islamists would not subject themselves to the same constraints of governing within a more fully democratic regime in order to compete with other political forces and win and exercise power. 
